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Abstract 
Privacy-related vulnerabilities and risks are often embedded into applications during their development, with this 
action being either performed out of malice or out of negligence. Moreover, the majority of the mobile applications 
initiate connections to websites, other apps, or services outside of its scope causing significant compromise to the 
oblivious user. Therefore, mobile data encryption or related data-protection controls should be taken into account 
during the application development phase. This paper evaluates some standard apps and their associated threats 
using publicly available tools and demonstrates how an ignorant user or an organisation can fall prey to such 
apps. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, organisations have been deploying mobile applications to facilitate their business processes. 
Employees, customers, and vendors experience the exceptional exchange of services increasing productivity in 
the working environment through sharing of real-time information, free mobility, and better functionality. 
Notwithstanding mobile apps benefits, however, usage of mobile apps can potentially lead to severe security 
hitches. Similar to obsolete enterprise applications, apps may contain vulnerabilities prone to attack. An attacker 
may exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorised access to an organisation’s information technology 
resources or a user’s data (Quirolgico, Voas, Karygiannis, Michael, & Scarfone, 2015). 
Literature Review 
In the recent past, software delivery to an end user has taken a fundamental paradigm shift with easy-to-download, 
install, and use applications from mobile app markets. High-end user demand for Android apps has led to an 
increase in the production rate at which applications are developed and released in the market without overseeing 
authority. Although these contribute to an equal playing ground for both small organisations and prominent 
software development companies, the massive growth of new apps could equally compromise apps’ security. 
Deploying new technology could have tragic consequences, causing a potential security threat to an organisation’s 
IT resources, data, and users. ANZ Bank in rolling out their new ANZ app while retiring their GoMoney app is 
asking users to download and install the new app with their previous registered credentials. While new 
technologies may offer the promise of productivity gains and new capabilities, they may also present new risks. 
It is vital for an organisation’s IT experts and users to be made fully aware of these risks and either develop plans 
to mitigate them or accept their consequences (Coyne, 2018). 
Most large active enterprise data has reported having been sporadically leaked from mobile apps. For instance, 
Appthority Enterprise mobile security vendor scanned 1100 apps that use a communications Application 
Programming Interface (API) marketed by Twilio. Figure 1 illustrates vulnerabilities in apps as exposed in 
developers’ hard-coded logs, which shows usernames and passwords credentials in their code (Appthority, 2017). 
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Figure 1 - Apps Exposing Hardcoded Credentials (Appthority, 2017) 
Access from the hardcoded credentials gives the attacker the ability to run a mass surveillance operation at a scale 
typically only available to governments and carriers. The scale, measured by total app installs, is likely to be in 
the hundreds of millions of impacted mobile users whose calls and text messages may all be accessed. 
The changing trend has contributed to mobile devices becoming indispensable components of our daily lives and 
integral parts of organisational culture. The current development of advanced processing, connectivity 
capabilities, and the ability for Android to host multi-purpose third-party applications, is a paradigm shift in 
organisation transformation that needs to be addressed. While mobile applications provide business agility, it also 
poses security challenges. Security threats for mobile apps have become common with more evidence of apps 
affected with malware in the Android market. Table 1 shows the list of malicious apps that were recently removed 
from the official Google Play Store. The mobile banking trojans concealed as device cleaners, boosters, or 
horoscopes have the capabilities to impersonate banking apps, intercept and send SMS, or install other applications 
(Stefanko, 2018). 
 
Table 1 - Mobile Application Malware (Stefanko, 2018) 
App Name Package Name Installs 
Power Manager com.puredevlab.powermanager 10+ 
Astro Plus com.astro.plus 0+ 
Master Cleaner - CPU Booster bnb.massclean.boost 5,000+ 
Master Clean - Power Booster mc.boostpower.lf 100+ 
Super Boost Cleaner cpu.cleanpti.clo 500+ 
Super Fast Cleaner super.dupclean.com 500+ 
Daily Horoscope For All Zodiac Signs ui.astrohoro.t2018 100 + 
Daily Horoscope Free - Horoscope 
Compatibility 
com.horochart.uk 500+ 
Phone Booster - Clean Master ghl.phoneboost.com 1,000+ 
Speed Cleaner - CPU Cooler speeeed.cool.fh 100+ 
Ultra Phone Booster ult.boostphone.pb 1,000+ 
Free Daily Horoscope 2019 fr.dayy.horos 50+ 
Free Daily Horoscope Plus - Astrology Online com.dailyhoroscope.free 1,000+ 
Phone Power Booster pwr.boost.pro 1,000+ 
Ultra Cleaner - Power Boost ua.cleanpower.boost 50+ 
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App Name Package Name Installs 
Master Cleaner - CPU Booster bnm.massclean.boost 5,000+ 
Daily Horoscope - Astrological Forecast gmd.horobest.ty 1,000+ 
Speed Cleaner – CPU Cooler speeeed.cool.gh 0+ 
Horoscope 2018 com.horo2018i.up 1,000+ 
Meu Horóscopo my.horoscop.br 1,000+ 
Master Clean - Power Booster mc.boostpower.cf 50+ 
Boost Your Phone boost.your.phone 1,000+ 
Phone Cleaner - Booster, Optimizer phone.boost.glh 1,000+ 
Clean Master Pro Booster 2018 pro.cleanermaster.iz 10+ 
Clean Master - Booster Pro bl.masterbooster.pro 5,000+ 
BoostFX. Android cleaner fx.acleaner.e2018 50+ 
Daily Horoscope day.horocom.ww 1,000+ 
Daily Horoscope com.dayhoroscope.en 1,000+ 
Personal Horoscope horo.glue.zodnow 1,000+ 
Background 
The purpose of this study is to establish security issues in Android smartphone applications. Android smartphones 
store diverse data such as multimedia, sensor data, communication logs, and data created or consumed by 
applications, and so on. An Android user carries the device over multiple locations throughout the day and allows 
connections to various networks that are often not secure. As the same device may be used for both work and 
leisure purposes, installed Android applications often contain a combination of valuable personal and business 
data. Exposing potential security vulnerabilities in commonly used Android applications will help understand the 
risk associated with mobile apps within corporate premises. 
Android smartphones extend the business perimeter, while existing security and privacy perimeter-oriented 
mechanisms are inadequate and easily compromised. In this context, the importance of Android applications 
interacting with corporate assets, make them economically attractive to attackers. This attraction happens because 
most people rarely consider Android-application threats when downloading from the Google Play Store. 
Furthermore, most vulnerability-assessment methods are not intended for individuals, but mainly for businesses. 
Thus, a targeted vulnerability assessment of Android applications is useful in assessing smartphone threats in a 
considerably more specific approach. We contribute towards this direction by identifying security threats on 
commonly used social media applications and compare different vulnerability-scanning frameworks tailored for 
Android applications. 
METHODS 
 
Static analysis 
Static analysis is performed without executing the application on the provided or decompiled source code and 
accompanying APK files (Velu, 2016). This method indeed proves to be more thorough when using AndroBugs 
and Ostorlab frameworks, and cost-efficient with the ability to detect critical and non-critical threats to apps from 
the Google Play Store. Static analysis also unearths weakness that would not emerge in a dynamic test. Static 
analyses using frameworks are used for: 
 Scanning of Android APK files 
 Determination of possible vulnerabilities 
 Reporting of any identified vulnerabilities 
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By demonstrating the effectiveness of different vulnerability-scanning frameworks and reporting the outcomes of 
mobile-app weaknesses and testing tools, organisations could use the same procedures to expose and determine 
the appropriateness of apps for deployment on an organisation's mobile devices. Ultimately, an organisation’s 
security requirements could then be followed to determine the environment for deployment, usage, and ideal 
mobile technologies. For instance, hospital or airline environments could consider a more comprehensive apps-
vetting process compared to a media or marketing company. This paper highlights some findings that are 
particularly important to consider before apps are approved for submission to the Play Store or Google Play 
markets. 
Google Play Apps 
Social networks are presently the most significant media spot in the world, and the most widely used channel for 
data, video and voice. Reporting and risk assessments generated by scanning frameworks demonstrate some 
exciting results. Table 2 below considers mobile applications downloaded from Google Play. 
 
Table 2 - Android Apps Used in Testing 
Apps PackageName Version Size 
(MB) 
Hash MD5 / SHA1 
Facebook com.facebook.katana 129.0.0.2
9.67 
68 eb68e95931dbfe27bd096220919a6cb2 
79b882db8cbfde5c04301f4e0c8c110e821
e9a7f 
IMO com.imo.android.imoi
m 
9.8.00000
0006751 
7.3 955a28e1b3a67ac3b0fa6a3a7f073b06 
ca3b0291a478cdf3780d10eb533c7e96e66
c021d 
Instagram com.instagram.android 10.26.0 27 48a284d59ff0f9affb7013962d5accfd 
80d103aaf6bae88c749f87321bf1e80c19b
04a1a 
LinkedIn com.linkedin.android 4.1.61 27.4 47d198045715829fd73ac5134bf889c8 
44ac8bce52e60352ab251702c5ab16ea81
309374 
Viber com.viber.voip 6.9.5.9 30.8 c9376fe2f5fc6d928bedd95c1b87299a 
f48d2a4fcf2b4ea944bc0077106e570b3ce
5eb88 
WhatsApp com.whatsapp 2.17.231 35 b26bf9b3ddb2aab5af342ac463076047 
33eae8c80c1b8f157af3d91d104c608b45f
95993 
Twitter com.twitter.android 7.0.0 34.2 e803a8f19ac3ddda5accbc6db87dd2e4 
5b36e1a22003ffcec88e7bea05f2e644cc36
4193 
WeChat com.tencent.mm 6.5.8 40 cf237d05ab4782081ac70cbd2210ee3e 
32ff65d4ee3cbce62d1a1e924a98ddfef1da
7e06 
Planning 
The study compared and analysed the outcomes of three different application-scanning frameworks to broadly 
gain an understanding of the various risks and vulnerabilities linked with the usage of leading social-media 
applications within business perimeters. However, on submission only the results of two frameworks have been 
analysed. The application-testing frameworks are: 
 AndroBugs Terminal Framework 
 OstorLab Cloud Framework 
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AndroBugs Terminal Framework 
AndroBugs is an Android app-vulnerability scanner that provides an advanced security assessment for Android 
apps and uncovers potential critical issues relating to user applications. AndroBugs checks every component in 
the app to ascertain flaw-security and correct logic that would instead be exploited by hackers. Security problems 
can still perpetuate within the Android environment, because: 
 Google may never employ app security that enforces or rates the security of an app. 
 Google may never take down vulnerable apps from Google Play. 
 Google already knows some security problems in certain Android applications. 
 There are too many applications that use vulnerable APIs. 
AndroBugs could help improve Android security, although companies need to give mobile security the same 
attention given to Web security by following Android-security researchers’ exercise of responsible disclosure and 
acknowledge vulnerability reports they receive. Figure 2 below demonstrates how apps could be verified before 
being approved for installation by the end user (Quirolgico et al., 2015). 
 
 
Figure 2 - Application Verification Process (Quirolgico et al., 2015) 
Ostorlab Web-Based Framework 
Ostorlab is a cloud-based application scanner framework for Android or iOS apps, and gives detailed information 
on the findings. An APK file is uploaded as an attachment to the framework which generates a security scan report 
in a few minutes. Figure 3 illustrates the Ostorlab scanning process in a web environment (Spreitzenbarth, 2013). 
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Figure 3 - Ostorlab Web-Based App Scanning Framework (Spreitzenbarth, 2013) 
Scanning Process 
The scanning process comprises of three main steps: 
1. Generating APK files. 
2. Scanning using AndroBugs. 
3. Ostorlab framework. 
Downloading APK files 
All APK files were downloaded from Google Play using a web-services downloader. Following are the steps to 
download the APKs: 
1. Open Evozi website ( https://apps.evozi.com/apk-downloader/). 
2. On a separate web browser, open Google Play (https://play.google.com). 
3. Search and view the apps. 
4. On the apps page, right-click on the “Install” button and select copy address (This step may be different 
depending on the web browser. We were using Opera). 
5. Going back to Evozi, past the URL on the Google Play URL (see Figure 4). 
6. Click Generate Download Link. 
7. Click ‘Click here to download <app package name> now. 
8. Verify MD5 hashes. 
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Figure 4 - Evozi Web Service: Download APK 
Scanning using Ostorlab 
1. Go to Ostorlab website (https://www.Ostorlab.co) and click the scan icon. 
2. Fill in the fields, select your APK file and click scan (see Figure 5). 
3. Ostorlab will email the link of the result. 
 
 
Figure 5 – Scanning on Ostorlab 
Scanning using AndroBugs 
1. Using Kali Linux, unzipped AndroBugs to the directory. 
2. Open a terminal and execute the command: 
Python androbugs.py –f apk file  -o output result 
Figure 6 demonstrates how to execute the command: 
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Figure 6 - Running Androbugs 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Vulnerability Findings 
Vulnerabilities from the frameworks used have been categorised in order of priority and potential impact to the 
end user. Table 3 shows the categorisation used for both tools: 
 
Table 3 - Risk Categorization 
AndroBugs Ostorlab 
Critical High / Potentially 
Warning Important 
Notice Medium 
Info Note 
 
The following vulnerabilities were discovered after running the eight mobile apps. Table 4 summarises the 
results from AndroBugs. Vulnerabilities with an Info categorisation, which indicates that there was no issue 
found on the specific static analysis, were not included in this table. Table 5 illustrates the results from Ostorlab. 
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Table 4 - AndroBugs Result 
Title Category Facebook IMO Instagram LinkedIn Twitter Viber WhatsApp WeChat 
<SSL_Security> SSL Connection Checking Critical true true true true true true true true 
<WebView><Remote Code Execution><#CVE-2013-
4710#> WebView RCE Vulnerability Checking: 
Critical true true true true true true  true 
<Implicit_Intent> Implicit Service Checking Critical true true  true  true true true 
 AndroidManifest ContentProvider Exported Checking Critical true  true     true 
<SSL_Security> SSL Certificate Verification Checking Critical true  true    true  
<SSL_Security> SSL Implementation Checking 
(Verifying Host Name in Custom Classes) 
Critical true  true      
App Sandbox Permission Checking Critical  true  true  true true true 
<Hacker> Base64 String Encryption Critical  true      true 
<#CVE-2013-6272#> AndroidManifest Exported Lost 
Prefix Checking 
Critical true        
<Command> Runtime Command Checking Critical   true   true true true 
<KeyStore><Hacker> KeyStore Protection Checking Critical   true      
AndroidManifest Dangerous ProtectionLevel of 
Permission Checking 
Critical     true    
<#BID 64208, CVE-2013-6271#> Fragment Vulnerability 
Checking 
Critical       true  
External Storage Accessing Warning  true true true true true true true 
AndroidManifest Exported Components Checking Warning true true true true true true true true 
<Sensitive_Information> Getting ANDROID_ID Warning true true true true true true true true 
<WebView> WebView Local File Access Attacks 
Checking 
Warning true true true true true true  true 
Dynamic Code Loading Warning  true true true   true true 
<WebView> WebView Potential XSS Attacks Checking Warning true true true true true true   
Codes for Sending SMS Warning  true       
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Title Category Facebook IMO Instagram LinkedIn Twitter Viber WhatsApp WeChat 
<Sensitive_Information> Getting IMEI and Device ID Warning true  true   true  true 
AndroidManifest "intent-filter" Settings Checking Warning    true     
<SSL_Security> SSL Certificate Verification Checking Warning      true   
AndroidManifest Normal ProtectionLevel of Permission 
Checking 
Warning        true 
<Database><#CVE-2011-3901#> Android SQLite 
Databases Vulnerability Checking 
Notice  true true true true true true true 
<Signature><Hacker> Getting Signature Code Checking Notice  true true true true true true true 
Native Library Loading Checking Notice  true true  true true true true 
<Hacker> APK Installing Source Checking Notice  true true  true true true  
File Unsafe Delete Checking Notice true true true true true true true true 
AndroidManifest Exported Components Checking 2 Notice true true true true true true true true 
<Command> Executing "root" or System Privilege 
Checking 
Notice true true true  true  true true 
<Debug><Hacker> Codes for Checking Android Debug 
Mode 
Notice true  true   true   
<KeyStore><Hacker> Possible KeyStore File Location Notice     true    
 AndroidManifest Adb Backup Checking Notice      true   
<KeyStore><Hacker> KeyStore File Location Notice      true   
<KeyStore><Hacker> KeyStore Protection Information Notice      true   
<Database> Android SQLite Databases Encryption 
(SQLite Encryption Extension (SEE)) 
Notice  true    true   
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Table 5 - Ostorlab Results 
Title Category Facebook IMO Instagram LinkedIn Twitter Viber WhatsApp WeChat 
Virustotal malware analysis (MD5 based search) High  true       
Services declared without permissions Potentially true true true true  true true true 
Backup mode enabled Potentially     true true   
Insecure Filesystem Access Potentially        true 
Intent Spoofing Potentially       true  
Exported activites, services and broadcast receivers list Important true true true true true true true true 
Decompiled source code Important  true true true true true true  
ELF binaries do not enforce secure binary properties Medium true    true   true 
Application code not obfuscated Medium     true    
Hardcoded SQL queries list Note true true true true  true   
Hardcoded urls list Note true true true true  true   
APK files list Note true true true true true true true true 
APK attack surface Note true true true true true true true true 
Virustotal malware analysis (MD5 based search) Note true  true true true true true true 
Hardcoded strings list Note true true true true true true true true 
Android Manifest Note true true true true true true true true 
List of JNI methods Note true true true true true true true true 
Implementation of a FileObserver Note  true true      
Obfuscated methods Note  true true true true true true  
Call to XML parsing API Note  true  true true true true  
Call to native methods Note  true true true true true true  
Application checks rooted device Note  true true true true true   
Implementation of a WebViewClient Note  true true true true true   
Call to Inter-Process-Communication (IPC) API Note  true true true true true true  
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Title Category Facebook IMO Instagram LinkedIn Twitter Viber WhatsApp WeChat 
Call to External Storage API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to dangerous WebView settings API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to Socket API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to logging API Note  true true true true true true  
Application components list Note  true true true true true true  
Call to SSL/TLS API Note   true true true true true  
Application certificate information Note  true  true true true true  
Call to Reflection API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to Crypto API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to Random API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to SQLite query API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to dynamic code loading API Note  true true true true true true  
Call to command execution API Note   true  true true true  
MoPub Framework detected Note     true    
URL Scheme listURL Scheme list Note  true     true true 
 
 
Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018) 25
Vulnerability and Risk Assessments 
Based on the findings generated by the above tools, eighty different social media applications that are commonly 
used in Android smartphones were analysed. The result indicates various risk levels that exist in Android mobiles 
and therefore putting the user in high risk of leaking both individual and organisational data when interfacing with 
installed apps from Google Play. Consequently, this merits targeted specific app-vulnerability assessment. 
Threats on vulnerable apps are: 
 Personal user data-leakage over a network, e.g. email, IMEI, GPS, MAC. 
 Unencrypted communication over the network. 
 Having world-readable/writable files. 
 Poor authorization and authentication. 
 Information-stealing malware. 
 Known vulnerabilities. 
Sensitive data leakage 
Sensitive data leakage can happen when an app is improperly storing user information. Mobile apps should avoid 
unnecessary storage of data on a device. According to OWASP “Insecure data storage, occurs when development 
teams assume that users will not have access to the phones file system and store sensitive pieces of information 
in data-stores on the phone. Devices file systems are often easily accessible, and the user should expect a malicious 
entity to be inspecting the data stores. Rooting or jailbreaking a device usually circumvents any encryption 
protections, and in some cases, where data is not protected properly, all that is needed to view application data is 
to hook the phone up to a computer and use some specialised tools ” (OWASP, 2014a). 
 
Three apps may be susceptible to the Android SQLite Database Vulnerability (CVE-2011-3901). More so, it is 
suggested that all of the apps are using an unsecured way to delete files. By using file.delete(), any attacker, 
especially on rooted devices, may recover everything you delete. Also, almost all are using or have API calls to 
external data storage. It is imperative to ensure that sensitive information is handled well. It is also worth noting 
that the apps are reading the ANDROID_ID, IMEI and deviceID information. 
Unencrypted communication 
The most important feature of the client-server architecture is information exchange. When data is transmitted, it 
may be exchanged through the carrier network or the Internet. While developing an application, if care is not 
taken while sharing data between the client and server, there is a chance that the data may be compromised in 
transit. The best way to protect data in transit is to encrypt it. Encryption prevents sniffed data from read, 
particularly in the case of usernames, passwords, and credit card information. According to OWASP 
“Unfortunately, mobile applications frequently do not protect network traffic. They may use SSL/TLS during 
authentication, but not elsewhere, exposing data and session IDs to interception. Also, the existence of transport 
security does not mean it is implemented to its full potential. Detecting basic flaws is easy. Just observe the phone's 
network traffic. More subtle flaws require inspecting the design of the application and the application's 
configuration” (OWASP, 2014b). 
All apps include URLs that are not using SSL. Referencing the AndroBugs result, WeChat has the most number 
of URLs (44), followed by Instagram (16), Twitter (11), IMO (6), Viber (5), LinkedIn and WhatsApp (4), and 
Facebook (1). Also, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp do not check the validation of the SSL Certificate which 
allows self-signed, expired or mismatched Common Name (CN) certificates for SSL. 
Information disclosure read and writes 
Disclosure of relevant data stored in apps such as passwords and credit card details, which should remain 
hardcoded, is a requirement for any developer to prioritize because most applications developed for mobile 
devices can reveal the code when reversed engineered. A hacker could access this sensitive information that to 
further facilitate access to company resources compromising their reputation. 
Five apps were found to have permitted "MODE_WORLD_READABLE" or "MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE" 
on some of the services, in particular in using Advertising ID API. 
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Poor Authorization and Authentication 
Authentication and authorisation refer to user privileges granted for using an application. In an application with 
functionalities beyond publicly usable features, permission may be required for accessing free functions. 
Authentication refers to who you are in an application. For instance, email: xyz@a.b.c | Website: www.abc.edu. 
Authorisation points to what you are authorised to do in an application. When the authorisation and authentication 
schema fails to protect the application, the privileged functions in the application are compromised, rendering it 
vulnerable to attacks. Authorisation and authentication should be dealt with accurately while developing an 
application to ensure that unauthorised users are not granted access to sensitive information. This can be achieved 
by ensuring secure session-handling and login functions. 
Information Stealing Malware 
Mobile smartphones, in particular, Android devices, provide several ways for applications to be downloaded and 
installed, for example from official Google Play Store, from other third-party marketplaces, or from APK-
downloading sites. Currently, most distribution of malware for smartphones have utilised third-party app stores. 
Mainly, malware distributed through the third-party target to steal data from the mobile device (Kaspersky, 2016). 
ZitMo is one of the most rampant pieces of mischievous code for a smartphone. It started in 2010 for Symbian 
OS, and designed to forward SMS messages. ZitMo for Android targeted the SMS-based banking two-factor 
authentication (Maslennikov, 2011) (Alliance, 2012). 
Malware apps target information on Facebook accounts. The malicious apps try to collect data from Facebook. If 
no account can be collected, it launches the spoofed Facebook login UI to steal user credentials. Once malware 
connects to a real Facebook page, it takes full control of user profile (Zhang & Aimoto, 2018). 
When downloading APKs, the Snapshot app was mistakably analysed instead of the Snapchat app. The lapse was 
later discovered after receiving a different hash check. The error was due to a Google search result, which indexed 
items being searched on the address. 
Known Vulnerabilities 
Table 6 shows the known vulnerabilities identified: 
 
Table 6 - Known Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability Reference Apps Description Affected Platform 
CVE-2013-6271  
 
WhatsApp Allow an attacker to 
remove the device locks 
and bypass restrictions 
("CVE-2013-6271," 2013) 
 
Before Android 4.4 (API 
19) 
CVE-2011-3901 Viber / WhatsApp / 
IMO 
SQLite Journal Information 
Disclosure vulnerability 
("CVE-2011-3901," 2011) 
 
Before Android 4.0 
CVE-2013-4710 
 
Facebook / IMO / 
Viber / LinkedIn / 
Twitter / Instagram / 
WeChat 
This method can be used to 
allow JavaScript to control 
the host application ("CVE-
2013-4710," 2013) 
Prior to Android 4.2 
CONCLUSION 
Organisations face frequent threats to data security and privacy, and prioritising these in the noise of continuously 
developing security concerns is difficult. The main focus of this research was to demonstrate vulnerabilities that 
exist in commonly used social network apps and analyse the threats with the highest potential impact on the 
business environment. The results highlight security issues to be considered by organisations and application 
users. 
A vulnerable app that has access to corporate data is a potential channel for such threats, and is rarely monitored 
when interfacing with the restricted commercial environment. Google Play, with a high volume of apps, largely 
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stores unmitigated mobile applications. App-data leakage, un-encrypted communication, and unauthorised access 
vulnerabilities demonstrate the need for organisations to understand and protect against a broader set of app risks 
to sensitive data. Both AndroBugs and Ostorlab frameworks show how simple errors by a developer can deluge 
substantial amounts of data across hundreds of apps, opening the possibility for the mass data exposure and user 
surveillance of an organisation. 
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